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David A. Moss

John G. McLean Professor of Business Administration
Unit Head, Business, Government and the International Economy

Contact (617) 495-6762
Overview Biography Publications & Course Materials Current Research Areas of Interest

Books

Balleisen, Edward, and David Moss, eds. Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

Moss, David, and John Cisternino, eds. New Perspectives on Regulation. Cambridge, Mass.: The Tobin Project, 2009.

Moss, David A. The Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2007.

Moss, David A. When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004, paperback ed.

Moss, David A. When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. (Winner of the Kulp-Wright Book Award.)

Moss, David A. Socializing Security: Progressive-Era Economists and the Origins of American Social Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996.

Published Papers

Moss, David. "An Ounce of Prevention: Financial Regulation, Moral Hazard, and the End of 'Too Big to Fail'." Harvard Magazine, September - October 2009, 24–29.

Moss, David. "Private Risk is the Public's Business." The American Prospect 20, no. 4 (May 2009).

Moss, David. "Leave No Risk Behind." On My Mind. Forbes Magazine, July 23, 2007.

Moss, David A., and Michael Fein. "Economic Theory on Media Markets is Flawed." The Financial Times, June 23, 2003, p. 13.

Moss, David A., and Michael R. Fein. "Radio Regulation Revisited: Coase, the FCC, and the Public Interest." Journal of Policy History 15, no. 4 (2003).

Moss, David A. "Book Review of Beatrix Hoffman's The Wages of Sickness: The Politics of Health Insurance in Progressive America." Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 27, no. 5 (October 2002): 869-873.

Moss, David A., and Sarah A. Brennan. "Managing Money Risk in Antebellum New York." Studies in American Political Development 15, no. 2 (fall 2001).

Moss, David A., and Bruce R. Scott. "An Economy for Kosovo, One Building Block at a Time." The New York Times, July 4, 2001, A15.

Moss, David A., and Gibbs A. Johnson. "The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both." American Bankruptcy Law Journal 73 (spring 1999): 311-351. (Winner of the Editors' Prize for the Best Article of 1999, American Bankruptcy Law Journal.)

Hamilton, W. L., N. Burstein, David A. Moss, and M. B. Hargreaves. "CAP: New York State's Experiment with Economic Incentives." Public Welfare 52, no. 1 (winter 1994): 6-17.

Moss, David A. "Kindling a Flame under Federalism: Progressive Reformers, Corporate Elites, and the Phosphorous Match Campaign of 1909-12." Business History Review 68, no. 2 (summer 1994): 244-275.

Book Chapters

Moss, David and Mary Oey. "The Paranoid Style in the Study of American Politics." In Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation, edited by Edward Balleisen and David Moss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. Abstract

What drives policy making in a democracy?  The conventional view is that political actors, like economic actors, pursue their self interest, and that special interest groups dominate the policy making process by satisfying policy makers’ need for money and other forms of political support.  Indeed, many scholars regard this economic theory of regulation as a general theory of politics.  George Stigler himself claimed that “temporary accidents aside,” exceptions “simply will not arise: our extensive experience with the general theory in economics gives us the confidence that this is so.”

In this chapter, we suggest that exceptions – including major ones – may in fact arise.  We focus on three historical cases in which special interests apparently gave way to the general interest in the policy making process: the enactment of Medicare in 1965, in which the powerful doctors’ lobby failed in its bid to stop the legislation; the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which passed overwhelmingly despite the absence of any economically powerful interest group behind it; and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), which became law over the strenuous objections of the powerful chemical industry lobby.  In all three of these cases (and especially in the latter two), the proposed legislation became unstoppable in the aftermath of a relevant horror story – e.g., Love Canal, in the case of Superfund – that received extensive coverage in the press. 

Although one could argue that we focus only on high-profile cases, and that capture theory applies more cleanly to policies that slip under the public’s radar screen, we have never seen the economic theory of regulation advertised as “a theory of minor legislative events.” 

Ultimately, the challenge for scholars will be to identify the conditions under which special interests dominate (or capture) public policy and the conditions under which they do not.  Although such a task lies far beyond the scope of this chapter, the three cases surveyed here suggest at least one potentially important dynamic: that in the presence of a free press, real-life horror stories with bearing on policy issues may serve to blunt the power of special interests by informing and catalyzing public opinion.

 


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Baker, Tom and David Moss. "Government as Risk Manager." Chap. 4 in New Perspectives on Regulation, edited by David Moss and John Cisternino, 87-109. Cambridge, Mass.: The Tobin Project, 2009.

Moss, David A. "Courting Disaster: The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803." In The Financing of Catastrophe Risk, edited by K. Froot, 307-355. University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Moss, David A. "The Deutsche Bank." In Creating Modern Capitalism, edited by Thomas McCraw. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997.

Other Papers

Moss, David A. "Government, Markets, and Uncertainty: An Historical Approach to Public Risk Management in the United States." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 97-025.

Moss, David, and Stephanie Lo. "Financing Higher Education in Australia." March 2009. (Draft case.) Abstract

Even before Australian lawmakers abolished university tuition in 1973, students in Australia had long benefited from low tuition and large government subsidies. By the early 1980s, however, the nation’s universities faced growing budget challenges and an apparent shortage of capacity as demand for higher education surged. Policymakers, cognizant of a growing budget deficit as well as a hard-hitting recession, hesitated to provide increased funding to higher education.

The debate over how best to finance Australian higher education finally came to a head in the late 1980s, following publication of the Report of the Committee on Higher Education Funding (commonly known as the Wran Report). Although the Wran Committee had considered several potential funding schemes, it ultimately proposed a radical system in which students would pay tuition financed through income-contingent loans provided by the government.

The Wran Report proved to be of particular interest to the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Hawke. The government’s fiscal position seemed to demand that educational financing be overhauled, but there was no consensus on how best to do this. Could the Prime Minister convince his Australian Labor Party to abandon the free-education plank in its platform? And even if he could, how could he be sure that the Wran Committee’s strategy was the right one and that its recommendations were workable? Would following an American model of full tuition for higher education and government-guaranteed student loans make more sense? These were just a few of the questions that the Prime Minister confronted as he contemplated new approaches for financing higher education in Australia.


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Moss, David, and Cole Bolton. "Steering Monetary Policy Through Unprecedented Crises." March 2009. (Draft case.) Abstract

In early April 2008, economic conditions in Europe appeared to be deteriorating on almost all fronts: sales figures were falling, business and consumer confidence were slumping, forecasts for European growth were being revised downward, and inflation was rising. In fact, figures for the month of March revealed that inflation had reached an annualized rate of 3.5%, Europe’s highest level since 1992. On top of these broad economic problems, the European financial sector—indeed, the financial sector worldwide—was in turmoil. By April 2008, global financial institutions had written down the value of their mortgage-related investments and other assets by at least $230 billion, and businesses around the world were complaining that it was ever more difficult to secure credit. In America, meanwhile, consumer confidence was falling, consumer spending had slowed to a near halt, and inflation had crept above 4%. In reaction to these dismal economic conditions, the Federal Reserve had steadily cut interest rates over a seven-month period, most recently lowering its key rate to 2.25% on March 18. In sharp contrast to the Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB) had long held its key rate at 4%, where it stood when the ECB’s Governing Council reconvened on April 10, 2008. Given both the market turmoil and the evident inflationary pressure, members of the ECB’s Governing Council would have to weigh the available data extremely carefully as they decided whether to raise, lower, or maintain their benchmark interest rate. The significance of this decision could hardly be overstated, since it had the potential to send a strong signal about the nature of European monetary policy and the priorities of the ECB going forward.
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Moss, David, Cole Bolton, and Andrew Novo. "Danatbank." February 2009. (Draft case.) Abstract

In the summer of 1931, Germany was struggling with a deepening economic crisis.  Production had fallen, unemployment was high, and bank deposits and gold were being withdrawn from the country at a rapid pace, threatening the value of the German mark.   The country’s third largest bank, the Danatbank, was especially hard hit by the flagging economy and the flight of capital.  By July, the Danatbank was on the verge of collapse, and the bank’s charismatic and controversial senior partner, Jakob Goldschmidt, appealed personally to the government, the central bank, and his private banking rivals for a lifeline.
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Moss, David, Cole Bolton, and Eugene Kintgen. "The Pecora Hearings." February 2009. (Draft case.) Abstract

In 1932, in the depths of the Great Depression, the Senate Banking Committee began a much-publicized investigation of the nation’s financial sector.  The hearings, which came to be known as the Pecora hearings after the Banking Committee’s lead counsel Ferdinand Pecora, revealed how the country’s most respected financial institutions knowingly misled investors as to the desirability of certain securities, engaged in irresponsible investment behavior, and offered privileges to insiders not afforded to ordinary investors.  During the famous “Hundred Day” congressional session that began his presidency, Roosevelt signed two bills meant to prevent some of these abuses.  The first law required companies to register new securities with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and to publish prospectuses with detailed information on their business ventures before they could offer new securities to the public.  The second law established insurance for bank deposits and forced financial institutions to choose between investment and commercial banking.
Roosevelt also believed that the government should play a more active role in the financial system by regulating national securities exchanges.  In February 1934, the president urged Congress to enact such legislation, prompting the introduction of a bill entitled the Securities Exchange Act.  If enacted, this bill would force all securities exchanges to register with the Federal Trade Commission, would curtail the size of loans that could be advanced to securities investors, and would ban a number of practices (such as short-selling) that were thought to facilitate stock manipulation.  Additionally, the legislation would require that all companies with exchange-listed securities publish detailed business reports as frequently as the FTC desired and would subject any company or exchange deemed to be in violation of the act’s provisions to increased legal liability.
Wall Street, represented in particular by New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) President Richard Whitney, took a strong position against the Securities Exchange Act.  Whitney was ultimately summoned to testify during the congressional hearings on the Securities Exchange Act in late February 1934.  Would he be able to convince lawmakers that the Securities Exchange Act would impose overly burdensome regulations on exchanges and stifle American securities markets, or would his arguments fail to win over those who believed that strict regulations were exactly what financial markets required following the Great Crash?
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Moss, David A. "An Ounce of Prevention: The Power of Public Risk Management in Stabilizing the Financial System." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-087, January 2009. Abstract

The magnitude of the current financial crisis reflects the failure of an economic and regulatory philosophy that had proved increasingly influential in policy circles over the past three decades.

 This paper suggests (1) that contrary to the prevailing wisdom, New Deal policies (including federal deposit insurance and bank supervision) worked to stabilize the financial system; (2) that the financial catastrophe of 2007-2009 was not an accident, but rather a mistake, driven by a deregulatory mindset that took 50 years of post-New Deal financial stability for granted; and (3) that the dramatic federal response to the current financial crisis has created a new reality, in which virtually all systemically significant financial institutions now enjoy an implicit guarantee from the federal government that will continue to exist (and continue to generate moral hazard) long after the immediate crisis passes.

 Based on this analysis, one major step that is necessary now to help ensure financial stability in the future is to identify and regulate "systemically significant" institutions on an ongoing basis, rather than simply in the heat of a crisis. To guard against moral hazard (in the face of large implicit guarantees) and to ensure the safety of the broader financial system, these institutions must face significant prudential regulation, they should be required to pay premiums for the federal insurance they already enjoy, and they should be subject to an FDIC-style receivership process in the event of failure.


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Dyck, Alexander, David A. Moss, and Luigi Zingales. "Media versus Special Interests." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 14360, September 2008.

Moss, David A., and Jonathan B. Lackow. "Rethinking the Role of History in Law & Economics: The Case of the Federal Radio Commission in 1927." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-008, August 2008. Abstract

In the study of law and economics, there is a danger that historical inferences from theory may infect historical tests of theory.  It is imperative, therefore, that historical tests always involve a vigorous search not only for confirming evidence, but for disconfirming evidence as well.  We undertake such a search in the context of a single well-known case: the Federal Radio Commission's (FRC's) 1927 decision not to expand the broadcast radio band. The standard account of this decision holds that incumbent broadcasters opposed expansion (to avoid increased competition) and succeeded in capturing the FRC.  Although successful broadcaster opposition may be taken as confirming evidence for this interpretation, our review of the record reveals even stronger disconfirming evidence.  In particular, we find that every major interest group, not just radio broadcasters, publicly opposed expansion of the band in 1927, and that broadcasters themselves were divided at the FRC's hearings.

Close

Moss, David, and Mary Oey. "The Paranoid Style in the Study of American Politics." January 2008. Abstract

What drives policy making in a democracy?  The conventional view is that political actors, like economic actors, pursue their self interest, and that special interest groups dominate the policy making process by satisfying policy makers’ need for money and other forms of political support.  Indeed, many scholars regard this economic theory of regulation as a general theory of politics.  George Stigler himself claimed that “temporary accidents aside,” exceptions “simply will not arise: our extensive experience with the general theory in economics gives us the confidence that this is so.”

In this paper, we suggest that exceptions – including major ones – may in fact arise.  We focus on three historical cases in which special interests apparently gave way to the general interest in the policy making process: the enactment of Medicare in 1965, in which the powerful doctors’ lobby failed in its bid to stop the legislation; the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which passed overwhelmingly despite the absence of any economically powerful interest group behind it; and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), which became law over the strenuous objections of the powerful chemical industry lobby.  In all three of these cases (and especially in the latter two), the proposed legislation became unstoppable in the aftermath of a relevant horror story – e.g., Love Canal, in the case of Superfund – that received extensive coverage in the press. 

Although one could argue that we focus only on high-profile cases, and that capture theory applies more cleanly to policies that slip under the public’s radar screen, we have never seen the economic theory of regulation advertised as “a theory of minor legislative events.” 

Ultimately, the challenge for scholars will be to identify the conditions under which public policy is dominated (or captured) by special interests and the conditions under which it is not.  Although such a task lies far beyond the scope of this paper, the three cases surveyed here suggest at least one potentially important dynamic: that in the presence of a free press, real-life horror stories with bearing on policy issues may serve to blunt the power of special interests by informing and catalyzing public opinion.


Close

Moss, David A., and Jonathan Lackow. "Early Radio Regulation, Capture Theory, and the Problem of History-by-Inference." 2006.

Moss, David A. "Macro for Managers." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 05-042, 2005. Abstract

This note attempts to provide a conceptual overview of macroeconomics.  Designed for managers and students of management, it emphasizes fundamental ideas and relationships, rather than mathematical models and formulas.  The note identifies -- and is structured around -- three essential pillars of macroeconomics: output, money, and expectations.

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Moss, David A., and Sarah Brennan. "Regulation and Reaction: The Other Side of Free Banking in Antebellum New York." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 04-038, 2004. Abstract

Free banking, which first appeared in the United States in the late 1830s, comprised two essential features: general incorporation for banks and rigorous security requirements for note issue. Because the general incorporation feature is what allowed free entry, it has typically been heralded as the centerpiece of the institution, leading some scholars to characterize free banking as laissez faire banking. Far from allowing free bankers complete freedom of action, however, free banking laws actually prohibited the most common form of intermediation of the time. By requiring that bank notes be fully backed with high-grade securities, these laws prevented banks from intermediating between liquid notes on the one hand and illiquid loans on the other. The purpose for this paper, therefore, is to explore the other side of free banking -- the regulatory side which banned the use of notes as a source of funds for non-marketable lending. After tracing the intellectual and legislative history of free banking in New York State (the first state to adopt an enduring free banking statute), we show that New York's 1838 law placed significant constraints on note issue, which ultimately helped to transform the nature of bank money throughout the state. We find, in particular, that these constraints led to a significant reduction in the issue of bank notes and a concomitant increase in the relative importance of demand deposits. This effect is visible not only by comparing note-to-deposit ratios in free versus chartered banks, but also by tracking changes in this ratio among a sample of chartered banks that were forced to convert to free banks when their charters expired (at scattered moments throughout the 1840s and 1850s). We conclude that the rise of free banking not only enhanced competition in the market for banking services (as a result of free entry) but fundamentally transformed bank balance sheets as well (as a result of the strict security requirement for note issue).

Close

Moss, David, and Michael Fein. "'Pure Accidents' and the Evolving Bias of American Liability Law." 2001.

Moss, David, and Michael Fein. "Revisiting Coase's Federal Communications Commission: The Costs of Problematic History." 2001.

Moss, David A., and Sarah Brennan. "Managing Money Risk in Antebellum New York: From Chartered Banking to Free Banking and Beyond." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 00-011, 1999.

Moss, David A., and Gibbs A. Johnson. "The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?" Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 98-104, 1998.

Moss, David A. "Stop-Loss Capitalism: The Ex Ante and the Ex Post of Debtor Protection in America." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 99-023, 1998.

Moss, David A. "Limited Liability and the Birth of American Industry: Theory Meets History." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 98-079, 1998.

Moss, David A. "Public Risk Management and the Private Sector: An Exploratory Essay." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 98-073, 1998.

Moss, David A. "Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1803." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 97-049, 1997.

HBS Course Materials

Moss, David A., Sarah A. Brennan, and Tiffany Morris. "The American System." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 704-703.

Moss, David A., Tiffany Morris, and Sarah A. Brennan. "American System, The." Harvard Business School Case 704-036.

Moss, David, and Eugene Kintgen. "The Armstrong Investigation." Harvard Business School Case 708-034.

Moss, David A., and Sarah A. Brennan. "Basic Statistics from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, 2002." Harvard Business School Supplement 703-030.

Moss, David A., and Sarah A. Brennan. "Basic Statistics from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, 2002." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 703-701.

Moss, David A., Sarah A. Brennan, and Peter Epstein. "Basic Statistics from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, 2004." Harvard Business School Supplement 705-022.

Moss, David A., and Cole Bolton. "The Campaign for Bank Insurance in Antebellum New York." Harvard Business School Case 708-037.

Moss, David A. "Confronting the Third Industrial Revolution." Harvard Business School Case 796-161.

Moss, David A. "Confronting the Third Industrial Revolution TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 797-064.

Moss, David A. "Constructing a Nation: The United States and Their Constitution, 1763-1792." Harvard Business School Case 795-063.

Moss, David A. "Constructing a Nation: The United States and Their Constitution, 1763-1792 TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 796-047.

Moss, David A., George R. Appling, and Andrew D Archer. "Creating the International Trade Organization." Harvard Business School Case 798-057.

Moss, David A. "Creating the International Trade Organization TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 701-107.

Moss, David A., and Wyatt C. Wells. "Crisis at the Federal Reserve: Arthur Burns and the Stagflation of 1973-75." Harvard Business School Case 797-079.

Moss, David A. "Crisis at the Federal Reserve: Arthur Burns and the Stagflation of 1973-75 TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 701-108.

Moss, David A., Louis T. Wells Jr., and Courtenay Sprague. "Data Supplement Nixon Economic Strategy--1969." Harvard Business School Supplement 798-046.

Moss, David A., and Louis T. Wells Jr. "Data Supplement on the Great Depression." Harvard Business School Supplement 799-066.

Moss, David A., Louis T. Wells Jr., and Courtenay Sprague. "Data Supplement The Tax Cut of 1964." Harvard Business School Supplement 798-045.

Moss, David A., and Nicolaj Siggelkow. "The Deutsche Bank." Harvard Business School Case 796-106.

Moss, David A. "The Deutsche Bank (A)." Harvard Business School Case 708-044.

Moss, David A. "Deutsche Bank, The TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 797-026.

Moss, David A., and Eugene Kintgen. "The Dojima Rice Market and the Origins of Futures Trading." Harvard Business School Case 709-044.

Moss, David A., and Cole Bolton. "Envisioning "Free Banking" in Antebellum New York (A)." Harvard Business School Case 708-038.

Moss, David A., and Joseph P Gownder. "Explaining the Great Depression." Harvard Business School Compilation 799-067.

Moss, David A., and Cole Bolton. "Fannie Mae: Public or Private?" Harvard Business School Case 709-025.

Moss, David A., and Cole Bolton. "The Federal Reserve and the Banking Crisis of 1931." Harvard Business School Case 709-040.

Moss, David, and Cole Bolton. "Financing American Housing Construction in the Aftermath of War." Harvard Business School Case 708-032.

Moss, David A. "Free Trade vs. Protectionism: The Great Corn-Laws Debate (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 701-140.

Moss, David A., Kevin P. Brennan, Matthew B. Gorin, and Marian Lee. "Free Trade vs. Protectionism: The Great Corn-Laws Debate." Harvard Business School Case 701-080.

Moss, David A. "Free Trade vs. Protectionism: The Great Corn-Laws Debate TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 701-110.

Moss, David A., Anne Dias, and Bertrand O. Stephann. "French Pension System, The: On the Verge of Retirement?" Harvard Business School Case 798-032.

Moss, David A. "French Pension System, The: On the Verge of Retirement? & (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 701-027.

Moss, David A. "French Pension System, The: On The Verge Of Retirement? (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 799-143.

Dyck, Alexander, and David A. Moss. "Gerber Products Co.: Exchange Rate Exercise." Harvard Business School Supplement 798-097.

Moss, David A., and Julio J. Rotemberg. "German Hyperinflation of 1923, The." Harvard Business School Case 798-048.

Moss, David A., and Julio J. Rotemberg. "German Hyperinflation of 1923, The TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 701-109.

Moss, David A., and Julie Rosenbaum. "Great Mississippi Flood of 1993." Harvard Business School Case 797-097.

Moss, David A., and Anna Harrington. "Inequality and Globalization." Harvard Business School Note 705-040.

Moss, David A., and Sarah A. Brennan. "Insurer of Last Resort? The Federal Financial Response to September 11." Harvard Business School Case 703-041.

Moss, David A., Louis T. Wells Jr., and Lakshmi Gopalan. "International Institutions." Harvard Business School Note 796-116.

Abdelal, Rawi, David Moss, and Eugene Kintgen. "The International Monetary Fund in Crisis." Harvard Business School Case 708-035.

Moss, David A. "Macroeconomic Policy and the State of the U.S. Economy, 2003." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 704-702.

Moss, David A. "Macroeconomic Policy and the State of the U.S. Economy, 2003." Harvard Business School Case 704-030.

Moss, David A., Mary Oey, and Jonathan Lackow. "Managing Failure: American Bankruptcy Law at a Crossroads." Harvard Business School Case 705-024.

Moss, David A., and Sarah A. Brennan. "National Economic Accounting: Past, Present, and Future." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 703-702.

Moss, David A., and Sarah A. Brennan. "National Economic Accounting: Past, Present, and Future." Harvard Business School Case 703-026.

Moss, David A., and Wyatt C. Wells. "Note on Money and Monetary Policy." Harvard Business School Note 797-094.

Moss, David A., and Nick Bartlett. "Note on WTO Disputes: Five Major Cases." Harvard Business School Note 703-016.

Moss, David A., and Joseph P Gownder. "Origins of National Income Accounting." Harvard Business School Case 799-080.

Moss, David A., and Eugene Kintgen. "Ruling the Modern Corporation: The Debate over Limited Liability in Massachusetts." Harvard Business School Case 708-016.

Moss, David A., Eugene Kintgen, and Agnieszka Rafalska. "The South Sea Company (A)." Harvard Business School Case 708-005.

Moss, David A. "Unemployment in France: "Priority Number One"." Harvard Business School Case 795-064.

Moss, David A. "Unemployment in France: "Priority Number One" TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 796-048.

Moss, David A., and Cole Bolton. "Wall Street's First Panic (A)." Harvard Business School Case 708-002.

Moss, David A., and Nick Bartlett. "World Trade Organization, The." Harvard Business School Case 703-015.