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Laura Alfaro

Associate Professor of Business Administration

Contact (617) 495-7981
Overview Biography Publications & Course Materials Current Research Areas of Interest

Books

Alfaro, Laura. Global Capital and National Institutions: Crisis and Choice in the International Financial Architecture. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2010. Abstract

All managers face a business environment in which international and macroeconomic phenomena matter. International capital flows can significantly affect countries' development efforts and provide clear investment opportunities for businesses. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the world witnessed an explosion in capital flows at the global level. Gross foreign assets and liabilities stood at two or three times GDP for many countries, as compared to just two decades ago. This explosive growth, especially in emerging markets, has been fueled both by changes in world politics (e.g., the end of the Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union, shifting political climate in China, and political changes in Latin America and Asia) and advances in technology. Private capital flows—debt finance, equity capital, and foreign direct investment (FDI)—became larger than current and past official capital flows. This new era of foreign capital mobility has also been characterized by low interest rates in industrial countries, growing external imbalances in the U.S. economy, and the rise of China, all of which posed new challenges to policy management. In 2009, the global economy remained mired in a deep crisis following the subprime meltdown in the U.S. The situation was also a true testimony of how intertwined individual economies had become over the years. The effect of policies to deal with the ongoing global crisis and new policy choices remain to be seen. Understanding these phenomena—the determinants of capital flows, the effects of foreign capital on host countries, the impact of exchange-rate movements, and the genesis of financial and currency crises—is a crucial aspect to making informed managerial decisions. The cases in this book have been designed to give students an appreciation of the critical role of institutions and policies in affecting patterns of international capital flows and the abilities of government to manage them effectively. The case studies are tied together by two broad themes: (1) the determinants and effects of international capital, and (2) policy-makers' management of these flows. The cases approach these themes by exploring institutional detail in deep local context. The cases expose students to recent key events that have shaped the way economists think about these subjects. The events covered have a clear global perspective as the cases are set in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, as well as the United States. The cases also cover events that occurred during the last three decades as not only do they affect the business environment that managers face today but they also hold important lessons. An important feature the cases reveal is the cyclical nature of international capital flows. Global Capital and National Institutions: Crisis and Choice in the International Financial Architecture is composed of three intellectual segments: (1) Determinants and Effects of International Capital Flows, (2) Policies and Strategies for Harnessing the Benefits of Financial Globalization, (3) Challenges and Policies of Large Economies. Chapter I presents a detailed overview of the cases and readings in the module and relates the cases included to the main patterns of international capital flows in the last thirty years. Finally, the chapter also presents the key insights from the field of international economics covered in the cases as well as the current state of debate among policy-makers.
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Published Papers

Alfaro, Laura, and Anusha Chari. "India Transformed? Insights from the Firm Level 1988–2005." India Policy Forum (forthcoming). (Also NBER Working Paper w15448.) Abstract

Using firm-level data, this paper analyzes the transformation of India's economic structure following the implementation of economic reforms. The focus of the study is on publicly listed and unlisted firms from across a wide spectrum of manufacturing and services industries and ownership structures such as state-owned firms, business groups, and private and foreign firms. Detailed balance sheet and ownership information permit an investigation of a range of variables such as sales, profitability, and assets. Here we analyze firm characteristics shown by industry before and after liberalization and investigate how industrial concentration, the number, and size of firms of the ownership type evolved between 1988 and 2005. We find great dynamism displayed by foreign and private firms as reflected in the growth of their numbers, assets, sales, and profits. Yet, closer scrutiny reveals no dramatic transformation in the wake of liberalization. The story, rather, is one of an economy still dominated by the incumbents (state-owned firms) and, to a lesser extent, traditional private firms (firms incorporated before 1985). Sectors dominated by state-owned and traditional private firms before 1988-1990, with assets, sales, and profits representing shares higher than 50%, generally remained so in 2005. The exception to this broad pattern is the growing importance of new and large private firms in the services sector. Rates of return also have remained stable over time and show low dispersion across sectors and across ownership groups within sectors.
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Alfaro, Laura, and Fabio Kanczuk. "Nominal versus Indexed Debt: A Quantitative Horse Race." Journal of International Money and Finance (forthcoming). (Also Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 05-053 and NBER Working Paper No. 13131.) Abstract

The main arguments in favor of and against nominal and indexed debt are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks. We model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortion, government outlays uncertainty, and contingent-debt service. Our framework also recognizes that contingent debt can be associated with incentive problems and lack of commitment. Thus, the benefits of unexpected inflation are tempered by higher interest rates. We obtain that costs from inflation more than offset the benefits from reducing tax distortions. We further discuss sustainability of nominal debt in developing (volatile) countries.


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Alfaro, Laura, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Areendam Chanda, and Selin Sayek. "Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Growth? Exploring the Role of Financial Markets on Linkages." Journal of Development Economics 91, no. 2 (March 2010): 242-256. (Also Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 07-013 and NBER Working Paper No. w12522.) Abstract

Do multinational companies generate positive externalities for the host country? The evidence so far is mixed varying from beneficial to detrimental effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on growth, with many studies that find no effect. In order to provide an explanation for this empirical ambiguity, we formalize a mechanism that emphasizes the role of local financial markets in enabling FDI to promote growth through backward linkages. Using realistic parameter values, we quantify the response of growth to FDI and show that an increase in the share of FDI leads to higher additional growth in financially developed economies relative to financially under-developed ones.
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Alfaro, Laura, and Andrew Charlton. "Intra-Industry Foreign Direct Investment." American Economic Review 99, no. 5 (December 2009): 2096-2119. (Also Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 08-018 and NBER Working Paper No. 13447.) Abstract

We use a new firm-level dataset that establishes the location, ownership, and activity of 650,000 multinational subsidiaries. Using a combination of four-digit-level information and input-output tables, we find the share of vertical FDI (subsidiaries that provide inputs to their parent firms) to be larger than commonly thought, even within developed countries. Most subsidiaries are not readily explained by the comparative advantage considerations whereby multinationals locate activities abroad to take advantage of factor cost differences. Instead, multinationals tend to own the stages of production proximate to their final production, giving rise to a class of high-skill, intra-industry vertical FDI.
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Alfaro, Laura, and Fabio Kanczuk. "Optimal Reserve Management and Sovereign Debt." Journal of International Economics 77, no. 1 (February 2009): 23-36. (Also Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 07-010, 2006 and NBER Working Paper No. 13216.) Abstract

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign’s willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs.
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Alfaro, Laura, and Fabio Kanczuk. "Debt Maturity: Is Long-Term Debt Optimal?" Review of International Economics 17, no. 5 (2009): 890-905. (Also Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 06-005 and NBER Working Paper No. 13119.) Abstract

We model and calibrate the arguments in favor and against short-term and long-term debt. These arguments broadly include: maturity premium, sustainability, and service smoothing. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortions and government outlays uncertainty, and model maturity as the fraction of debt that needs to be rolled over every period. In the model, the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates. We then calibrate our artificial economy and solve for the optimal debt maturity for Brazil as an example of a developing country and the U.S. as an example of a mature economy. We obtain that the calibrated costs from defaulting on long-term debt more than offset costs associated with short-term debt. Therefore, short-term debt implies higher welfare levels.
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Alfaro, Laura, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Selin Sayek. "FDI, Productivity, and Financial Development." Special Issue on Multinational Enterprises and Foreign Direct Investment. The World Economy 32, no. 1 (January 2009): 111-135. Abstract

This paper examines the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on growth by focusing on the complementarities between FDI inflows and financial markets. In our earlier work, we found that FDI is beneficial for growth only if the host country has well-developed financial institutions. In this paper, we investigate whether this effect operates through factor accumulation and/or improvements in total factor productivity (TFP). Factor accumulation – physical and human capital – does not seem to be the main channel through which countries benefit from FDI. Instead, we find that countries with well-developed financial markets gain significantly from FDI via TFP improvements. These results are consistent with the recent findings in the growth literature that shows the important role of TFP over factors in explaining cross-country income differences.
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Alfaro, Laura, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Vadym Volosovych. "Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation." The Review of Economics and Statistics 90, no. 2 (May 2008): 347–368. Abstract

We examine the empirical role of different explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich to poor countries – the “Lucas Paradox.”  The theoretical explanations include cross country differences in fundamentals affecting productivity and capital market imperfections.  We show that during 1970-2000, low institutional quality is the leading explanation.  Improving Peru’s institutional quality to Australia’s level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment.  Recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the specific mechanisms.  Our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions affect long-run development.


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Alfaro, Laura, and Eliza Hammel. "Capital Flows and Capital Goods." Journal of International Economics 72, no. 1 (May 2007): 128-150. (Link to working paper version.) Abstract

Studying the relation between equity market liberalization and imports of capital goods, we examine one channel through which international financial integration can promote growth. For the period 1980–1997, we find that after controlling for other policies and fundamentals, stock market liberalizations are associated with a significant increase in the share of imports of machinery and equipment. We hypothesize this can be attributed to the consequences of financial integration, which allows access to foreign capital, and provide evidence consistent with this channel. Our results suggest that increased access to international capital allows countries to enjoy the benefits embodied in capital goods.
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Alfaro, Laura. "Inflation, Openness, and Exchange Rate Regimes." Journal of Development Economics 77, no. 1 (June 2005). Abstract

This paper further tests Romer’s (1993) extension of Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) predictions for dynamic-inconsistency problems in open economies. In a panel data set of developed and developing countries from 1973 to 1998, I find that openness does not play a role in restricting inflation in the short-run. On the other hand, a fixed exchange-rate regime plays a significant role. The results are robust to controlling for other variables that determine inflation, performing sensitivity analysis, and using a de facto exchange-rate regime classification.
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Alfaro, Laura, and Fabio Kanczuk. "Sovereign Debt As a Contingent Claim: A Quantitative Approach." Journal of International Economics 65, no. 2 (March 2005). Abstract

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model with contingent service and adverse selection to quantitatively study sovereign debt. In the model, benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates. For a wide set of parameters, the only equilibrium is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states; additional output losses, however, sustain equilibria that resemble the data. We show that due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default to reduce loss of reputation. Moreover, although equilibria with no default imply in greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in highly indebted and volatile countries.
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Alfaro, Laura, Areendam Chanda, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Selin Sayek. "FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets." Journal of International Economics 64, no. 1 (October 2004). Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the various links among foreign direct investment, financial markets and growth. We model an economy with a continuum of agents indexed by their level of ability. Agents have two choices: they can work for the foreign company in the FDI sector and use their wealth to earn a return or they can choose to undertake entrepreneurial activities, which are subject to a fixed cost. Better financial markets allow agents in the economy to take advantage of knowledge spillovers from FDI. The empirical evidence suggests that FDI plays an important role in contributing to economic growth. However, the level development of local financial markets is crucial for these positive effects to be realized.
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Alfaro, Laura. "Capital Controls: A Political Economy Approach." Review of International Economics 12, no. 4 (September 2004). Abstract

This paper examines the economic consequences of political conflicts that arise when countries implement capital controls. In an overlapping-generations model, agents vote on whether to open or close an economy to capital flows. The young (workers) receive income from wages only while the old (capitalists) receive income from savings only. We characterize the set of stationary equilibria for an infinite horizon game. Assuming dynamic-efficiency, when the median representative is a worker (capitalist), capital-importing countries will open (close) while capital-exporting countries will close (open). These predicted patterns are consistent with data on liberalization policies over time and across various
countries.
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Alfaro, Laura, and Fabio Kanczuk. "Capital Controls, Risk and Liberalization Cycles." Review of International Economics 12, no. 3 (August 2004). Abstract

The paper presents an overlapping-generations model where agents vote on whether to open or close the economy to international capital flows. Political decisions are shaped by the risk over capital and labor returns. In an open economy, the capitalists (old) completely hedge their savings income. In contrast, in a closed economy, the workers (young) partially insulate wages from the productivity shocks.There are three possible equilibrium outcomes: economies that eventually remain open; those that eventually remain closed; and those that cycle between open and closed. In line with the stylized facts, cycles are more common in economies with intermediate development levels.
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Alfaro, Laura, and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. "Multinationals and Linkages: An Empirical Investigation." Economia (spring 2004). Abstract

Several recent papers have used plant-level data and panel econometric techniques to carefully explore the existence FDI externalities. One conclusion that emerges from this literature is that it is difficult to find evidence of positive externalities from multinationals to local firms in the same sector (horizontal externalities). In fact, many studies find evidence of negative horizontal externalities arising from multinational activity while confirming the existence of positive externalities from multinationals to local firms in upstream industries (vertical externalities). In this paper we explore the channels through which these positive and negative externalities may be materializing, focusing on the role of backward linkages. In particular, we criticize the common usage of the domestic sourcing coefficient as an indicator of a firm’s linkage potential and propose an alternative, theoretically derived indicator. We then use plant-level data from several Latin American countries to compare multinationals’ linkage potential to that of domestic firms. We find that multinational’s linkage potential in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela is higher than for domestic firms. For Mexico, we cannot reject the hypothesis that foreign and local firms have similar linkage potential. Finally, we discuss the relationship between this finding and the conclusions that emerge from the recent empirical literature.
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Abdelal, Rawi, and Laura Alfaro. "Capital and Control: Lessons from Malaysia." Challenge 46, no. 4 (July/August 2003): 36-53. (Also published in French as "Contrôle des capitaux: les enseignements de l’expérience malaisienne." Problèmes économiques, no. 2,837 (December 2003), pp. 21-28.)

Alfaro, Laura. "On the Political Economy of Temporary Stabilization Programs." Economics and Politics (July 2002). Abstract

This paper provides a political economy explanation for temporary exchange-rate-based stabilization programs by focusing on the distributional effects of real exchange-rate appreciation. I propose an economy in which agents are endowed with either tradable or nontradable goods. Under a cash-in-advance assumption, a temporary reduction in the devaluation rate induces a consumption boom accompanied by real appreciation, which hurts the owners of tradable goods. The owners of nontradables have to weigh two opposing effects: an increase in the present value of nontradable goods wealth and a negative intertemporal substitution effect. For reasonable parameter values, owners of nontradables are better off.
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Alfaro, Laura. "Why Governments Implement Temporary Stabilization Programs." Journal of Applied Economics 2, no. 2 (November 1999).

Book Chapters

Alfaro, Laura, Andrew Charlton and Fabio Kanczuk. "Plant-Size Distribution and Cross-Country Income Differences." In NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2008. Cambridge, Mass.: NBER, 2009. Abstract

We investigate, using plant-level data for 79 developed and developing countries, whether differences in the allocation of resources across heterogeneous plants are a significant determinant of cross-country differences in income per worker. For this purpose, we use a standard version of the neoclassical growth model augmented to incorporate monopolistic competition among heterogeneous plants. For our preferred calibration, the model explains 58% of the log variance of income per worker. This figure should be compared to the 42% success rate of the usual model.
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Alfaro, Laura, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan and Vadym Volosovych. "Capital Flows in a Globalized World: The Role of Policies and Institutions." In Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices, and Consequences, edited by Sebastian Edwards. National Bureau of Economic Research. University of Chicago Press, 2007. (Also NBER Working Paper No. 11696.)

Alfaro, Laura and Eliza Hammel. "Latin America Multinationals." In The Latin American Competitiveness Report. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. (Issued by: WEF in collaboration with CID.)

Other Publications

“Multinational Firms, Agglomeration, and Global Networks" with M. Chen. Voxeu.org Jan 2010.

"The Transformation of India: Incumbent Control, Reforms and Newcomers," with A. Chari. Voxeu.org, Dec. 2009.

"India's Pockets of Prosperity? SEZ Are Attractive on Paper, But They Pose Thorny Political Problems." with L. Iyer and S. Shah. The Christian Science Monitor, July 31, 2009.

Book Review "FDI: Analysis of Aggregate Flows" by A. Razin and E. Sadka, in Journal of Economic Literature XLVII (2009). Comment on "FDI and Economic Development," by T. Moran, in Brookings Trade Forum, 2007. Book Review "The Monetary Geography of Africa," by P. R. Masson and C. Patillo, in Journal of International Economics 67 (2005). Comment on "Integration, Interdependence and Regional Goods," by A. Bevilaqua, M. Catena and E. Talvi, in Economia 2 ( 2001.)

Other Papers

Alfaro, Laura, and Maggie Chen. "The Global Networks of Multinational Firms." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-043, December 2009. (Also NBER Working Paper 15576.) Abstract

In this paper we characterize the topology of global multinational networks and examine the macro and micro patterns of multinational activity. We construct indices of network density at both pairwise industry and establishment level and measure agglomeration in a global and continuous metric space. These indices exhibit distinct advantages compared to traditional measures of agglomeration including the independence on the level of geographic aggregation. Estimating the indices using a new worldwide establishment dataset, we investigate both the significance and causes of multinational firm co-agglomeration. In contrast to the conventional emphasis of the literature on the role of input-output linkages, we assess the effect of various agglomeration economies. We find that, relative to counterfactuals, multinationals with greater factor-market externalities, knowledge spillovers, and vertical linkages exhibit significant co-agglomeration. The importance of these factors differs across headquarters, subsidiary, and employment networks, but knowledge spillovers and capital-market externalities, two traditionally under-emphasized forces, exert consistently strong effects. Within each macro network, there is a large heterogeneity across subsidiaries. Subsidiaries with greater size and higher productivity attract significantly more agglomeration than their counterfactuals and become the hubs of the network.
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Alfaro, Laura, Paola Conconi, Andrew F. Newman, and Harald Fadinger. "Trade Policy and Firm Boundaries." Working Paper. Abstract

We examine how trade policy affects firms' organizational choices. We embed a model of firms' vertical integration decisions into a standard perfectly-competitive international trade framework. In the model, integration decisions are driven by a trade-off between the pecuniary benefits of coordinating production decisions and the managers' private benefits of operating in preferred ways. The price of output is a crucial determinant of this choice, since it affects the size of the pecuniary benefits: higher prices lead to more integration. Through its effect on product prices, trade policy also has an impact on firm boundaries. We use a unique dataset that allows us to construct firm-level indexes of vertical integration for a large set of countries. In line with the predictions of our model, we obtain three main results. First, higher tariffs lead to higher levels of vertical integration. Second, differences in ownership structure across countries, measured by the distance in sectoral vertical integration indexes, are smaller in sectors with similar levels of protection. Finally, ownership structures are more alike for members of regional trade agreements.
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Alfaro, Laura, and Faisal Ahmed. "The Price of Capital: Evidence from Trade Data." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 07-073, 2007.

Alfaro, Laura, and Andrew Charlton. "International Financial Integration and Entrepreneurial Firm Dynamics." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 07-012, 2006. (Also NBER Working Paper No. 13118.)

Alfaro, Laura, and Fabio Kanczuk. "Sovereign Debt: Indexation and Maturity." Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series, No. WP-560, 2006.

Teaching and Training Materials

Alfaro, Laura. "Globalization Meets National Institutions: International Capital Flows, Harvard Business School Module Note Instructor Only, 708-041."

HBS Course Materials

Alfaro, Laura, Eric D. Werker, and Renee Kim. "Aid, Debt Relief, and Trade: An Agenda for Fighting World Poverty (A)." Harvard Business School Case 707-029.

Alfaro, Laura, Eric D. Werker, and Renee Kim. "Aid, Debt Relief, and Trade: An Agenda for Fighting World Poverty (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 707-040.

Alfaro, Laura, Eric D. Werker, and Renee Kim. "Aid, Debt Relief, and Trade: An Agenda for Fighting World Poverty (TN) (A) and (B)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 707-049.

Alfaro, Laura, and Renee Kim. "Australia: The Riches and Challenges of Commodities." Harvard Business School Case 709-007.

Di Tella, Rafael M., Laura Alfaro, and Ezequiel Reficco. "Bolivia and Evo Morales." Harvard Business School Case 707-041.

Abdelal, Rawi E., Laura Alfaro, and Brett Laschinger. "Bombardier: Canada versus Brazil at the WTO." Harvard Business School Case 703-022.

Alfaro, Laura, Debora L. Spar, Faheen Allibhoy, and Vinati Dev. "Botswana: A Diamond in the Rough." Harvard Business School Case 703-027.

Alfaro, Laura. "Botswana: A Diamond in the Rough (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 703-036.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "Brazil 2003: Inflation Targeting and Debt Dynamics." Harvard Business School Case 704-028.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "Brazil 2003: Inflation Targeting and Debt Dynamics (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 704-039.

Alfaro, Laura. "Brazil: Embracing Globalization?" Harvard Business School Case 701-104.

Alfaro, Laura. "Brazil: Embracing Globalization? TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 702-079.

Abdelal, Rawi E., and Laura Alfaro. "Capital Controls." Harvard Business School Note 702-082.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "Capital Controls in Chile in the 1990's (A & B) (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 705-039.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "Capital Controls in Chile in the 1990s (A)." Harvard Business School Case 705-031.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "Capital Controls in Chile in the 1990s (B)." Harvard Business School Case 705-032.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "China: To Float or Not To Float? (A)." Harvard Business School Case 706-021.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, Ingrid Vogel, and Renee Kim. "China: To Float or Not To Float? (B)- Timeline of Changes Relevant to the Chinese Renminbi." Harvard Business School Case 706-022.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "China: To Float or Not To Float? (C)- Esquel Group and the Chinese Renminbi." Harvard Business School Case 706-023.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "China: To Float or Not To Float? (D)- Bank of America's Strategic Investment in China Construction Bank." Harvard Business School Case 706-031.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "China: To Float or Not To Float? (E)- ABB Investment in China." Harvard Business School Case 706-035.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "China: To Float or Not To Float? (F)- Alcatel and Strong Chinese Competition." Harvard Business School Case 706-036.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "China: To Float or Not To Float? (TN) (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 706-060.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Renee Kim. "Chronology of the Asian Financial Crisis." Harvard Business School Case 708-001.

Alfaro, Laura, and Ingrid Vogel. "Creditor Activism in Sovereign Debt: "Vulture" Tactics or Market Backbone." Harvard Business School Case 706-057.

Alfaro, Laura, and Ingrid Vogel. "Creditor Activism in Sovereign Debt: "Vulture" Tactics or Market Backbone (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 708-010.

Porte, Thierry, Rawi E. Abdelal, Laura Alfaro, and Jonathan Schlefer. "Crisis and Reform in Japan's Banking System (A)." Harvard Business School Case 710-036.

Porte, Thierry, Rawi E. Abdelal, Laura Alfaro, and Jonathan Schlefer. "Crisis and Reform in Japan's Banking System (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 710-037.

Alfaro, Laura, and Renee Kim. "The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century." Harvard Business School Case 709-057.

Alfaro, Laura, and Esteban Clavell. "Foreign Direct Investment." Harvard Business School Note 703-018.

Alfaro, Laura, Vinati Dev, and Stephen McIntyre. "Foreign Direct Investment and Ireland's Tiger Economy." Harvard Business School Case 706-007.

Alfaro, Laura. "Foreign Direct Investment and Ireland's Tiger Economy (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 706-025.

Alfaro, Laura, Vincent Marie Dessain, and Patrick Vachey. "French Unemployment: The Crisis Continues." Harvard Business School Supplement 707-020.

Alfaro, Laura, and Ingrid Vogel. "International Capital Markets and Sovereign Debt: Crisis Avoidance and Resolution." Harvard Business School Note 707-018.

Alfaro, Laura, and Akiko Kanno. "Kinyuseisaku: Monetary Policy in Japan (A)." Harvard Business School Case 708-017.

Alfaro, Laura, and Akiko Kanno. "Kinyuseisaku: Monetary Policy in Japan (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 709-056.

Alfaro, Laura, and Renee Kim. "Kinyuseisaku: Monetary Policy in Japan (TN) (A) & (B)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 708-028.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Renee Kim. "Korea: After the 1997 Financial Crisis." Harvard Business School Case 707-042.

Abdelal, Rawi E., and Laura Alfaro. "Malaysia: Capital and Control." Harvard Business School Case 702-040.

Abdelal, Rawi E., and Laura Alfaro. "Malaysia: Capital and Control (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 703-020.

Alfaro, Laura, Debora L. Spar, and Cate Reavis. "New Partnership for Africa's Development, The." Harvard Business School Case 704-006.

Alfaro, Laura, Yasheng Huang, and Marios S. Kalochoritis. "Power to the States: "Fiscal Wars" for FDI in Brazil." Harvard Business School Case 701-079.

Alfaro, Laura, and Lakshmi Iyer. "Public Purpose and Private Property (TN) (A) and (B)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 709-028.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, Ane Damgaard Jensen, and Vincent Marie Dessain. "Rovna Dan: The Flat Tax in Slovakia." Harvard Business School Case 707-043.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Renee Kim. "Rovna Dan: The Flat Tax in Slovakia (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 708-003.

Alfaro, Laura, and Renee Kim. "Sovereign Wealth Funds: For Profits or Politics?" Harvard Business School Case 708-053.

Alfaro, Laura, and Lakshmi Iyer. "Special Economic Zones in India: Public Purpose and Private Property (A)." Harvard Business School Case 709-027.

Alfaro, Laura, Lakshmi Iyer, and Namrata Arora. "Tata Motors in Singur: Public Purpose and Private Property (B)." Harvard Business School Case 709-029.

Alfaro, Laura, and Renee Kim. "Transforming Korea Inc: Financial Crisis and Institutional Reform." Harvard Business School Case 708-007.

Alfaro, Laura, and Renee Kim. "Transforming Korea Inc: Financial Crisis and Institutional Reform (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 708-027.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, Ingrid Vogel, Renee Kim, and Matthew Johnson. "The U.S. Current Account Deficit." Harvard Business School Case 706-002.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, and Ingrid Vogel. "The U.S. Current Account Deficit (CW)." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 706-701.

Alfaro, Laura, Rafael M. Di Tella, Ingrid Vogel, and Renee Kim. "The U.S. Current Account Deficit (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 706-008.

Alfaro, Laura, and Renee Kim. "U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Policy Reactions (A)." Harvard Business School Case 708-036.

Alfaro, Laura, and Renee Kim. "U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Policy Reactions (B)." Harvard Business School Case 709-045.

Alfaro, Laura, and Renee Kim. "U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Policy Reactions (TN) (A) and (B)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 710-003.