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photo of Ramon Casadesus-Masanell

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell

Associate Professor of Business Administration

Contact (617) 496-0176
Overview Biography Publications & Course Materials Current Research Areas of Interest

Published Papers

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Joan Enric Ricart. "From Strategy to Business Models and to Tactics." Long Range Planning (forthcoming): Special Issue on Business Models. Abstract

The notion of business model has been used by strategy scholars to refer to "the logic of the firm, the way it operates and how it creates value for its stakeholders." On the surface, this notion appears to be similar to that of strategy. We present a conceptual framework to separate and relate business model and strategy. Business model, we argue, is a reflection of the firm's realized strategy. We find that in simple competitive situations there is a one-to-one mapping between strategy and business model, which makes it difficult to separate the two notions. We show that the concepts of strategy and business model differ when there are important contingencies upon which a well-designed strategy must be based. Our framework also delivers a clear separation between tactics and strategy. This distinction is possible because strategy and business model are different constructs.


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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Andres Hervas-Drane. "Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (forthcoming). Abstract

We study competitive interaction between two alternative models of digital content distribution over the Internet: peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing and centralized client-server distribution. We present microfoundations for a stylized model of p2p file sharing where all peers are endowed with standard preferences and show that the endogenous structure of the network is conducive to sharing by a significant number of peers, even if sharing is costlier than freeriding. We build on this model of p2p to analyze the optimal strategy of a profit-maximizing firm, such as Apple, that offers content available at positive prices. We characterize the size of the p2p network as a function of the firm's pricing strategy and show that the firm may be better off setting high prices, allowing the network to survive, and acknowledging that the p2p network may work more efficiently in the presence of the firm than in its absence.
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Almirall, Esteve, and Ramon Casadesus-Masanell. "Open vs. Closed Innovation: A Model of Discovery and Divergence." The Academy of Management Review 35, no. 1 (January 2010). Abstract

When is open innovation superior to closed innovation? Through a formal simulation model, we show that an open approach to innovation allows the firm to discover combinations of product features that would be hard to envision under integration. However, when partners have divergent goals, open innovation restricts the firm’s ability to establish the product’s technological trajectory. The resolution of the trade-off between the benefits of discovery and the costs of divergence determines the best approach to innovation.
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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Michael Crooke, Forest L. Reinhardt, and Vishal Vasishth. "Households' Willingness to Pay for Public Goods: Evidence from Patagonia's Introduction of Organic Cotton Sportswear." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 18, no. 1 (spring 2009): 203-233. Abstract

To shed light on individuals' willingness to pay for "green" goods (i.e., goods that are supposed to have lower adverse environmental impacts either in production or in use), we study data from the introduction by Patagonia, Inc., of organic cotton sportswear in the mid 1990s.  Patagonia, a maker of high-end outdoor wear, substituted organic cotton for conventionally grown cotton in all of its sportswear (i.e., casual clothing for travel and leisure) in 1996.  We find that customers were willing to pay significant premiums for organic cotton garments although the organic cotton provided no demonstrable private incremental benefits to the customer.
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Creus Mir, Albert, Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, and Andres Hervas-Drane. "Bandwidth Allocation in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks." Computer Communications 31, no. 2 (February 2008): 257-265. Abstract

We present a model of bandwidth allocation in a stylized peer-to-peer file sharing network. Given an arbitrary population of peers composed of sharers and freeriders, where all peers interconnect to maximize their allocated bandwidth, we derive the expected bandwidth obtained by sharers and freeriders. We show that sharers are always better off than freeriders and that the difference decreases as the size of the network grows. This paper constitutes a first step towards providing a general analytical foundation for resource allocation in peer-to-peer networks.
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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and David B. Yoffie. "Wintel: Cooperation and Conflict." Management Science 53, no. 4 (April 2007): pp. 584-598. Abstract

We study competitive interactions between Intel and Microsoft, two producers of complementary products. In a system of complements, like the PC, the value of the final product depends on how well the different components work together. This, in turn, depends on the firms' investment in complementary R\&D. We ask whether Intel and Microsoft will want to cooperate and make the final product as valuable as possible. Contrary to the popular view that two tight complements will generally have well aligned incentives, we demonstrate that natural conflicts emerge over pricing, the timing of new product releases, and who captures the greatest value at different phases of product generations.
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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Pankaj Ghemawat. "Dynamic Mixed Duopoly: A Model Motivated by Linux vs. Windows." Management Science 52, no. 7 (July 2006): 1072-1084. Abstract

This paper analyzes a dynamic mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with a competitor that prices at zero (or marginal cost), with the cumulation of output affecting their relative positions over time.  The modeling effort is motivated by interactions between Linux, an open-source operating system, and Microsoft’s Windows, and consequently emphasizes demand-side learning effects that generate dynamic scale economies (or network externalities).  Analytical characterizations of the equilibrium under such conditions are offered, and some comparative static and welfare effects are examined.
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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F Spulber. "Trust and Incentives in Agency." USC Interdisciplinary Law Journal 15, no. 1 (fall 2005): 45-104. Abstract

Contracts between a principal and an agent are not formed in a vacuum. Although formal contracts between a principal and an agent contain explicit incentives for performance, the relationship between a principal and an agent also involves implicit incentives. Three types of forces provide implicit incentives: social norms, legal remedies, and market relationships. These forces create a system of trust that motivates agents to behave in a trustworthy fashion and principals to place their trust in agents. Thus, a complete description of the principal-agent relationship cannot be based on the formal contract alone. The implicit incentives that derive from the social, legal and market context reduce the need to rely on explicit incentives, allowing the principal and agent to reduce transaction costs by writing incomplete contracts.
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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Trust in Agency." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 13, no. 3 (September 2004): 375-404. Abstract

Existing models of the principal-agent relationship assume the agent works only under extrinsic incentives. However, many observed agency contracts take the form of a fixed payment. For such contracts to succeed, the principal must trust the agent to work in the absence of incentives. I show that agency fosters the advent of intrinsic motivation and trustworthy behavior. Three distinct motivational schemes are analyzed: norms, ethical standards, and altruism. I identify the conditions under which these mechanisms arise, and show how they promote trust. The analysis alters several important predictions of conventional models: total surplus is shared between principal and agent, the first best outcome ensues in highly uncertain environments, the principal is better off the more the agent is risk averse, and larger equilibrium extrinsic incentives need not be associated with larger effort or larger total surplus.
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Al-Najjar, Nabil I., Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, and Emre Ozdenoren. "Probabilistic Representation of Complexity." Journal of Economic Theory 111, no. 1 (July 2003): 49-87. Abstract

We study individuals' behavior in an environment that is deterministic, but too complex to permit tractable deterministic representation. Under mild conditions, behavior is represented by a unique probabilistic model in which the agent's inability to think through all contingencies of the problem translates into uncertainty about random states. We interpret this probabilistic model as embodying all patterns the agent perceives in his environment, yet allowing for the possibility that there may be important details he had missed. The implied behavior is rational in the traditional sense, yet consistent with an agent who believes his environment is too complex to warrant precise planing, foregoes finely detailed contingent rules in favor of vaguer plans, and expresses a preference for flexibility.
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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F. Spulber. "The Fable of Fisher Body." Journal of Law and Economics 43, no. 1 (April 2000): 67-104. Abstract

General Motors’ (GM) acquisition of Fisher Body is the classic example of market failure in the literature on contracts and the theory of the firm.  According to the standard account, GM merged vertically with Fisher Body in 1926, a maker of auto bodies, because of concerns over transaction-specific investment and contractual hold up.  That account exhibits errors of historical fact and interpretation. GM acquired a 60 percent interest in Fisher Body in 1919. Moreover, the contractual arrangements and working relationship prior to the 1926 merger exhibited trust rather than opportunism.  Fisher Body’s production technology did not exhibit asset specificity.  The merger reflected economic considerations specific to that time not some immutable market failure. We demonstrate that vertical integration was directed at improving coordination of production and inventories, assuring GM adequate supplies of auto bodies, and providing GM with access to the executive talents of the Fisher brothers.
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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Peter Klibanoff, and Emre Ozdenoren. "Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors." Journal of Economic Theory 92, no. 1 (May 2000): 35-65. Abstract

This paper provides an axiomatic foundation for a maxmin expected utility over a set of priors (MMEU) decision rule in an environment where the elements of choice are Savage acts. This characterization complements the original axiomatizations of MMEU developed in a lottery-acts (or Anscombe-Aumann) framework by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). MMEU preferences are of interest primarily because they provide a natural and tractable way of modeling decision makers who display an aversion to uncertainty or ambiguity. The novel axioms are formulated using standard sequence techniques, which allow cardinal properties of utility be expressed directly through preferences.
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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Peter Klibanoff, and Emre Ozdenoren. "Maxmin Expected Utility through Statewise Combinations." Economics Letters 66, no. 1 (January 2000): 49-54. Abstract

This paper provides an axiomatic foundation for a maxmin expected utility over a set of priors (MMEU) decision rule in an environment where the elements of choice are Savage acts. The key axioms are stated using statewise combinations as in Gul (1992).


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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Ford's Model-T: Pricing over the Product Life Cycle." ABANTE- Studies in Business Management 1, no. 2 (1998): 143-65. Abstract

The pricing decisions monopolistic firms make over time are determined to a large extent by the complex interplay of two distinct sets of elements: demand- and supply-based considerations. Demand factors include the possibilities of (a) exercising dynamic price discrimination, and (b) enhancing information diffusion about the product’s characteristics. The main cost (i.e., supply) element influencing pricing over the Product Life Cycle is the possibility to exploit learning economies. Although these two sets of factors — demand and supply — are inter-linked in complex ways, I will propose a methodology to separate them. I will apply this procedure to the case of Ford’s Model- T. We will be able to disentangle by how much demand issues (as opposed to cost based factors) affected the level and slope of the observed price sequence. I will also point out some issues regarding experience curve estimation and will outline a technique that allows for endogenous generation of sales and unit cost predictions.


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Book Chapters

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon and Joan E. Ricart. "Company Strategy: Business Model Reconfiguration for Innovation and Internationalization." In Competitiveness in Catalonia: Looking Ahead—A Report of the Center SP-SP at IESE Business School. University of Navarra, 2009.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F. Spulber. "The Fable of Fisher Body." In Famous Fables of Economics: Myths of Market Failures, edited by Daniel F. Spulber. Blackwell Publishers, 2001.

Other Papers

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Gaston Llanes. "Mixed Source." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-022, September 2009. Abstract

We study competitive interaction between profit-maximizing firms that sell software and complementary goods or services. In addition to tactical price competition, we allow firms to compete through business model reconfigurations. We consider three business models: the proprietary model (where all software modules offered by the firm are proprietary), the open source model (where all modules are open source), and the mixed source model (where a few modules are open). When a firm opens one of its modules, users can access and improve the source code. At the same time, however, opening a module sets up an open source (free) competitor. This hampers the firm's ability to capture value. We analyze three competitive situations: monopoly, commercial firm vs. non-profit open source project, and duopoly. We show that: (i) firms may become "more closed" in response to competition from an outside open source project; (ii) firms are more likely to open substitute, rather than complementary, modules to existing open source projects; (iii) when the products of two competing firms are similar in quality, firms differentiate through choosing different business models; and (iv) low-quality firms are generally more prone to opening some of their technologies than firms with high-quality products.


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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Feng Zhu. "Strategies to Fight Ad-sponsored Rivals." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-026, September 2009. Abstract

We analyze the optimal strategy of a high-quality incumbent that faces a low-quality ad-sponsored competitor. In addition to competing through adjustments of tactical variables such as price or advertising intensity, we allow the incumbent to consider changes in its business model. We consider four alternative business models, two pure models (subscription-based and ad-sponsored) and two mixed models that are hybrids of the two pure models. We show that the optimal response to an ad-sponsored rival often entails business model reconfigurations, a phenomenon that we dub "competing through business models." We also find that when there is an ad-sponsored entrant, the incumbent is more likely to prefer to compete through a pure, rather than a mixed, business model because of cannibalization and endogenous vertical differentiation concerns. We discuss how our study helps improve our understanding of notions of strategy, business model, and tactics in the field of strategy.


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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda. "Platform Competition, Compatibility, and Social Efficiency." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-058, October 2008. (Revised November 2009.) Abstract

Katz and Shapiro (1985) study systems compatibility in settings with one-sided plat- forms and direct network effects. We consider systems compatibility in settings with two-sided platforms and indirect network effects to develop an explanation why markets with two-sided platforms are often characterized by incompatibility with one dominant player who may subsidize access to one side of the market. We find that incompatibility gives rise to asymmetric equilibria with a dominant platform that earns more than under compatibility. We also find that incompatibility generates larger total welfare than compatibility when horizontal differences between platforms are small.


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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Barry Nalebuff, and David B. Yoffie. "Competing Complements." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-009, July 2008. Abstract

In Cournot's model of complements, the producers of A and B are both monopolists. This paper extends Cournot's model to allow for competition between complements on one side of the market. Consider two complements, A and B, where the A + B bundle is valuable only when purchased together. Good A is supplied by a monopolist (e.g., Microsoft) and there is competition in the B goods from vertically differentiated suppliers (e.g., Intel and AMD). In this simple game, there may not be a pure-strategy equilibria. In the standard case where marginal costs are weakly positive, there is no pure strategy where the lower quality B firm obtains positive market share. We also consider the case where A has negative marginal costs, as would arise when A can expect to make upgrade sales to an installed base. When profits from the installed base are sufficiently large, a pure strategy equilibrium exists with two B firms active in the market. Although there is competition in the complement market, the monopoly Firm A may earn lower profits in this environment. Consequently, A may prefer to accept lower future profits in order to interact with a monopolist complement in B.


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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F. Spulber. "Agency Revisited." 2005. Abstract

The article presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in agency. The legal remedy motivates agents to behave in a trustworthy fashion and principals to place their trust in agents. In contrast to the standard agency model, a complete description of the principal-agent relationship cannot be based on explicit incentives alone but must recognize implicit incentives for trust behavior that derive from the legal, social, and market context. These incentives reduce the need to rely on explicit incentives, allowing the principal and agent to reduce transaction costs by using incomplete contracts.
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Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Tarun Khanna. "Globalization and Trust." Working Paper, 2003.

Al-Najjar, Nabil, and Ramon Casadesus-Masanell. "Trust and Discretion in Agency Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 02-015, 2001.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F. Spulber. "The Fable of Fisher Body Revisited." 2000.

HBS Course Materials

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Erich Alexander Voigt, and Jordan Mitchell. "Airbus vs. Boeing (A)." Harvard Business School Case 707-447.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Erich Alexander Voigt, and Jordan Mitchell. "Airbus vs. Boeing (B): Should Airbus Build the VLCT Alone?" Harvard Business School Supplement 707-448.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Erich Alexander Voigt, and Jordan Mitchell. "Airbus vs. Boeing (C): Developments from 1996 to 1999." Harvard Business School Supplement 707-449.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Erich Alexander Voigt, and Jordan Mitchell. "Airbus vs. Boeing (D): 2000." Harvard Business School Supplement 707-450.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Erich Alexander Voigt, and Jordan Mitchell. "Airbus vs. Boeing (E): 2001." Harvard Business School Supplement 707-451.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Erich Alexander Voigt, and Jordan Mitchell. "Airbus vs. Boeing (F): 2002-2006." Harvard Business School Supplement 707-452.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Erich Alexander Voigt, and Jordan Mitchell. "Airbus vs. Boeing: Parts (TN) (A) to (F)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 710-405.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Jorge Tarzijan, and Jordan Mitchell. "Arauco (A): Forward Integration or Horizontal Expansion?" Harvard Business School Case 705-474.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Jorge Tarzijan, and Jordan Mitchell. "Arauco (B): "Papel" in Brazil." Harvard Business School Supplement 709-416.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Jorge Tarzijan, and Jordan Mitchell. "Arauco (TN) (A) and (B)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 706-439.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Neil Campbell. "Betfair vs. UK Bookmaker (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 709-418.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Neil Campbell. "Betfair vs. UK Bookmakers." Harvard Business School Case 709-417.

Reinhardt, Forest L., Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, and David J Hanson. "BP and the Consolidation of the Oil Industry, 1998-2002." Harvard Business School Case 702-012.

Reinhardt, Forest L., Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, and David J Hanson. "BP and the Consolidation of the Oil Industry, 1998-2002 and Supplement (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 706-048.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Maxime Aucoin. "Cirque du Soleil—The High-Wire Act of Building Sustainable Partnerships." Harvard Business School Case 709-411.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Joan E. Ricart. "Competing through Business Models (A)." Harvard Business School Module Note 708-452.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Joan E. Ricart. "Competing through Business Models (B): Competitive Strategy vs. Business Models." Harvard Business School Module Note 708-475.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Joan E. Ricart. "Competing through Business Models (C): Interdependence, Tactical & Strategic Interaction." Harvard Business School Module Note 708-476.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Taylor Philip Larson. "Competing Through Business Models (D)." Harvard Business School Module Note 710-410.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Competing Through Business Models: Introductory Note for Students." Harvard Business School Course Overview 710-409.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Tarun Khanna, Samuli Skurnik, and Jordan Mitchell. "Finland's S Group: Competing with a Cooperative Approach to Retail." Harvard Business School Case 709-409.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Jordan Mitchell, and Samuli Skurnik. "Finland's S Group: Competing with a Cooperative Approach to Retail (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 709-507.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Jordan Mitchell. "Greenpeace." Harvard Business School Case 708-418.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Jordan Mitchell. "Greenpeace and WWF (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 708-513.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, David B. Yoffie, and Sasha Mattu. "Intel Corporation: 1968-2003." Harvard Business School Case 703-427.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, David B. Yoffie, and Sasha Mattu. "Intel Corporation: 1968-2003; Intel Corporation: 2005 (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 704-465.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Michael G. Rukstad. "Intel Corporation: 1997-2000." Harvard Business School Case 702-420.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Jordan Mitchell. "Irizar in 2005." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 706-446.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Jordan Mitchell. "Irizar in 2005." Harvard Business School Case 706-424.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Jorge Tarzijan, and Mitchel Jordan. "Lan Airlines in 2008: Connecting the World to Latin America." Harvard Business School Case 709-410.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Jorge Tarzijan, and Jordan Mitchell. "Lan Airlines in 2008: Connecting the World to Latin America (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 709-492.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Celso Fernandez, and Moritz Jobke. "Launching Telmore (A)." Harvard Business School Case 708-414.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Celso Fernandez, and Moritz Jobke. "Launching Telmore (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 708-415.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Celso Fernandez, and Moritz Jobke. "Launching Telmore (C)." Harvard Business School Supplement 708-416.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Launching Telmore (TN) (A) and (B)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 708-520.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Jordan Mitchell. "Linux vs. Windows." Harvard Business School Case 707-465.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Linux vs. Windows (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 709-431.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Karla Ingrid Gravis, and Annette Kristine Rodriguez. "McDonald's Plan to Win (A)." Harvard Business School Case 709-419.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Tarun Khanna. "Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC)." Harvard Business School Case 702-457.

Khanna, Tarun, and Ramon Casadesus-Masanell. "Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC) TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 705-483.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "The Newsprint Industry (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 710-406.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Nabil I. Al-Najjar, and James Pyke. "Newsprint Industry, The." Harvard Business School Case 703-404.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Jordan Mitchell. "Note on the Bus Industry." Harvard Business School Case 708-435.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Joan Jove, and Claudia Paniker Rumeu. "OSHO®: From Spirituality to Business?" Harvard Business School Case 709-408.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Joan Jové Balasch, Claudia Pániker Rumeu, and Jordan Mitchell. "Osho®: From Spirituality to Business? (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 710-404.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Kevin Boudreau, and Jordan Mitchell. "Palm (A): The Debate on Licensing Palm’s OS (1997)." Harvard Business School Case 708-514.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Kevin Boudreau, and Jordan Mitchell. "Palm (B): 2001." Harvard Business School Supplement 708-515.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Kevin Boudreau, and Jordan Mitchell. "Palm (C): 2005." Harvard Business School Supplement 708-516.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Kevin Boudreau, and Jordan Mitchell. "Palm (D): Epilogue as of 2008." Harvard Business School Supplement 708-517.

Reinhardt, Forest L., Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, and Deborah Freier. "Patagonia." Harvard Business School Case 703-035.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Forest L. Reinhardt. "Patagonia (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 705-028.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Andres Hervas, and Jordan Mitchell. "Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods." Harvard Business School Case 706-479.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Andres Hervas-Drane, and Jordan Mitchell. "Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 706-487.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Catherine Jane Wise. "Sotheby's & Christie's Inc." Harvard Business School Case 710-412.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Strategy Simulation: Competitive Dynamics and Wintel." Harvard Business School HBSP Online Case Products 710-802.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Strategy Simulation: Competitive Dynamics and Wintel (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 710-403.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Jordan Mitchell. "Symantec vs. McAfee: Competing in the Consumer Anti-virus Industry." Harvard Business School Case 707-413.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Tarun Khanna, Jorge Tarzijan, and Jordan Mitchell. "Two Ways to Fly South: Lan Airlines and Southwest Airlines." Harvard Business School Case 707-414.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Jorge Tarzijan, and Jordan Mitchell. "Two Ways to Fly South: Lan Airlines and Southwest Airlines (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 710-422.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon. "Wintel." Harvard Business School HBSP Online Case Products 709-811.

Yoffie, David B., Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, and Sasha Mattu. "Wintel (A): Cooperation or Conflict." Harvard Business School Case 704-419.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Ann Winslow. "Wintel (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 709-475.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and David B. Yoffie. "Wintel (TN) (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 706-495.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Jordan Mitchell. "World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF)." Harvard Business School Case 708-417.